

SECRET

5-10 D/OER

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File: Vietnam

The Manpower Problem in North Vietnam

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provides data on manpower in North Vietnam. These data and analyses of economic, political and social activities give us a reasonably clear picture of the general manpower situation. The overwhelming weight of evidence points to the fact that North Vietnamese manpower resources are almost certainly more than adequate to support the war effort at present levels for an extended period and probably are adequate to support an expanded effort.

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Although conflicting reports make it impossible to determine the precise terms for conscription, we estimate that the present draft age is 17-35. There are a few reports that 16 year olds have been drafted. These occurrences are atypical and probably reflect local recruitment problems, or uneven and arbitrary application of draft regulations, rather than national conscription policies. The lowering of the draft age would be an extreme measure which we estimate Hanoi would not adopt until it had exhausted the several other options available for fuller mobilization of its manpower resources. We are reasonably confident that the sources available to us would provide adequate data to enable us to identify the emergence of a critical manpower situation in North Vietnam.

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OER/D/T: (30 Aug 67)

GROUP 1
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Essential Military Traffic in North Vietnam

As part of our analysis of the air war over North Vietnam, we analyze the impact of interdiction programs on the flow of essential military traffic. This traffic consists of the movement of material and equipment necessary for the defense of North Vietnam and the logistic support of its military establishment. We include in this traffic the supplies and equipment needed to maintain the logistical pipelines, and the supply requirements (excluding food of the Communist forces in South Vietnam).

In terms of military imports this traffic amounts currently to 550 tons a day. Most of this is consumed within North Vietnam. Only slightly over 10 percent of this amount -- 60 tons a day -- is moved out of North Vietnam to maintain its logistic pipelines and to support the Communist forces in South Vietnam. The movement of this traffic requires the use of less than 5 percent of the capacity available for moving imports into North Vietnam and well below 10 percent of the capacity of the infiltration routes through Laos.

The bombings have greatly complicated the movement of military traffic to the South and raised the internal requirements for war materiel. Imports of antiaircraft ammunition during 1966, for example, were double the volume imported during 1965, and will be even greater in 1967.

The air interdiction program has had little impact on the actual volume of military supplies being delivered to South Vietnam. It would, moreover, not be a restraining factor in determining the amounts

of troops or supplies North Vietnam might wish to move south in the future. Assuming that North Vietnam must maintain infiltration at its current rates in order to replace losses, we estimate that it would not be able to put more than an additional 70,000 troops in South Vietnam without sacrificing minimum home defense requirements. This force increase would raise daily external logistic requirements in South Vietnam by only 10 tons a day, assuming the greater part of their food continues to come from Cambodia. Thus the flow of military traffic would still remain below any capacity levels to which air attack could reasonably be expected to reduce the infiltration routes.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

The attached was prepared by []
[] as a supplement to the memo prepared
for the President on 29 August 1967. This
supplement answers questions asked by the
President after reading the original
paper.

wxn/per []
30 August 1967

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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